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Abstract
Bond is a message-oriented micldlewarc for nel work computing on a grid of autonomous nodes. The Bond
environment consists of (a) a distributed object infraslruclure, (b) a set of servers, (c) a set of agents, and (d) a
set of user objects. In this paper we overview lhe basic architecture of the system and introduce lhe security
models implemented in the Bond system. User programs as well as data are subject to the security constraints
imposed by Lbc local operating system. Bond objects arc subject to the access control and !.he aUlhemication
model discussed in this paper. Secure Bond objects arc allowed to create their own security agents 10 implement
access control.
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Server - Authentication and Software
Directory Server Virtual Network.
Internet Address of a host.
Distribution Server.
BID Bond Id. String uniquely identifying a Bond object.
BVN Bond Version Number. A string identifying the version of the Bond system
software. Stamped on each jar file at the software distribution time.
BUN - Bond User Name. String uniquely identifying a Bond user.
BP - Bond Password.
<Kpub,Kprv> - Pair of seed keys (public and private) assigned to a copy of the
Bond system software at the software distribution time.
<SKpub, SKprv> - Pair of object keys (public and private) assigned to a secure
Bond object e.g. a workspace.
BSD Bond Software Distribution object. Vector consisting of four-tupes
<IP,Kpub,Kprv,BVN>.
BK Bond Keys object. Vector consisting of triplets <BID, Kpub, Kprv)one for
each secure Bond object.
BU Bond Users object. Vector consisting of tuples <BUN, BP>.
Secure Bond Object - one with object keys.
Safe Bond Object - a secure Bond object with a security agent.
Introduction to Bond security
Bond is a message-oriented middleware for network computing _ When completed,
the Bond environment will consist of (a) a distributed object infrastructure,
(b) a set of servers, (c) a set of agents. and (d) a set of user objects. A
survey of the Bond architecture is presented in [1-4] and reviewed briefly
below.
Servers are permanent, their life time is rather long and provide system-wide
services e.g. the Bond System Monitor, BSM, Directory Servers, OS, Bond
Persistent Storage Server, BPSS, Authentication and Software Distribution
Server, A&SD, and so on. Agents are started upon request, work in conjecture
with one or more objects, and disappear after completing their function.
Examples of agents are Scheduling Agents and Security Agents[l] , [4].
Bond system and user objects are persistent and their storage is the
responsibility of the BPSS. Each object is uniquely identified by a Bond Id
created by concatenating the IP address of the local host with the local time
when the object was created. Access to objects can be gained by means of aDS.
An important class of Bond objects is executables, e.g. residents and
workspaces. A Bond executable consists of a Bond directory, a main thread of
control, and a messaging thread with two mailboxes an in box and an out: box.
Once an object is created it is registered with the local directory. Objects
located at different sites communicate with one another as shown in Figure 1.
The sender needs to locate the in box of the executable where an active object
is located, or must send it to the in box of Bond Persistent Storage Server if









Figure 1. The use of Bond Shadows for inter-object communication. To locate a
remote object B, object A sends a (find) performative to the Directory Server
is attached to, which in turn multicasts the request to all the members of the
Directory Server Virtual Network. Eventually one of the Directory Servers
locates object B. Object B then sends the information necessary to create the
Bond Shadow. From this instance on, all messages from A to B are sent to the
shadow of B which acts as a local proxy for the remote object.
In Bond we have defined a light-weight communication abstraction called the
shadow of an object to support unidirectional communication. The shadow of an
object acts as a local proxy. A Bond communication act consists of three steps:
1) Send the message to the local object called Bond shadow, which will perform
format conversion and security checks, and then deposit the message into the
out box of the local messaging thread at the sender's site.
2) Transport the message from the out box of the sender to the in box of the
receiver.
3) The local messaging thread at the destination will get the message in the in
box of the receiver, parse and deliver the message to its destination
object.
Another abstraction widely used in Bond is that of a virtual network. A group
of objects functionally related to one another form a virtual network. For
example the set of all servers supporting the Directory Service form the DSVN,
Directory Server Virtual Network.
Each Bond object provides a set of services. These services are available to
other objects by means of message patterns called Bond sub-protocols[6]. For
example, an object reveals its properties and allows other objects to modify
them by means of the property access sub-protocol. An executable understands
the monitoring sub-protocol that allows another object to monitor its
functions. A Directory Server understands the directory service sub-protocol
and so on [7].
Each sub-protocol is implemented by exchanging KQML messages [5] [6]. KQML is
indifferent to the format of the information itself and KQML messages may
contain information in the so called 'context language'. The meaning of a KQML
message is defined in terms of the constraints of the message sender and allows
the message receiver to choose a course of action compatible with other aspects
of its function.
KQML messages, called performatives allow to encode basic abstractions like
asking, replying, achieving, subscribing or notifying while the content of the
messages are partially encoded in the parameters, and partially assuming to be
known by both parties of communication. So the most suitable approach to
implement access control of Bond objects is to define and check the right to
use every type of KQML message. Each KQML message in Bond consists of a
performative field, a content field and one or more parameter fields. The
parameter fields in a KQML message indicate the target of the destination
object will operate on.
Bond uses a two-prong approach to system security [7-9]. Bond objects are
subject to the security model discussed in this section while each Bond
executable rUIming on a host relies on the security features of the local
system including password, access rights, quotas, etc. In this section we
discuss authentication and access control policies for Bond objects.
The important design decisions for Bond security model are: the granularity,
the scope, the policies and the mechanisms used by the model. Bond is an
object-oriented system, therefore we decided to support object level security.
We opted for a uniform model; the security model does not differentiate among
system and user objects. We decided to allow each object to define and
implement its own security, we only enforce a uniform interface to the security
functions. An object may define its own security agent to implement its
security policy. A group of objects may share a security agent.
The mechanisms used to enforce security cover authentication and access control
policies. The creator of a Bond object has the option to enforce security. Only
a secure Bond object may request authentication and access control. To
implement the access control model discussed in the next section we need to
expand the Bond shadow to contain the access control object, called Bond
ticket, for the destination object and the public key of the destination
object.
Access Control
Bond is a Message Oriented Middleware, therefore we decided to embed access
control mechanism into the Bond communication fabric. Bond objects act in
response to messages and perform functions according to pre-defined message
patterns called sub-protocols. The access control mechanism is based upon
access rights granted by an object by means of a Bond ticket and enforced by a
Bond Securi ty Agent.
The access control mechanism requires an extension of the Bond shadow objects.
Recall that a Bond object B sends messages for object A to the shadow of A,
which in turn delivers the messages to A (see Figure 1) _ We now extend the
shadow to contain a copy of the Bond ticket. If the shadow has a copy of the
ticket granted by A, it can filter messages and deliver to A only those which
conform to the access rights in the granted ticket.
A ticket defines the access rights as the ability to send KQML message with
specific perforrnative, content and parameters. A Bond object can grant the
access to its services at three levels. The first allows the use of specific
performatives, the second restricts the contents of the perforrnative and the
third further restricts the parameters. For example the ticket granted by B to











In this example B can only send to A the following types of KQML messages:
1. any (tell) and {notify};
2. (ask-one;get); this message allows B to exercise the property access sub-
protocol, and can get the value of any property of A.
3. (achive;set;alpha); this message allows B to exercise the property access










Figure 2. The access control ticket is generated at the time when the Bond
shadow is created. Object A establishes a communication channel to B. A sends a
request, (find) to the Directory Server Virtual Network which locates B and
requests information necessary to establish a shadow, (ask). Object B generates
the ticket granted to A, TKBA , and provides the information to create the
shadow, (tell). The shadow filters all messages from A to B according to the
access rights in the ticket.
The scheme described above works well if the grantor of a ticket trusts the
grantee. Filtering messages at the source guarantees that no unwanted messages
cross the network. But we need to provide also a scheme that goes beyond the
trust relationship and enforces the access control scheme. Such a scheme is
based upon security agents. A security agent is one capable to (a) generate and
store Bond tickets for one or more Bond objects and (b) enforce the access
control. Instead of sending a message to the destination object its shadow will
send the message to the security agent which acts as a proxy at the receiving










Figure 3. Access control for a safe Bond Object B. Object A establishes a
communication channel to a safe object B following a procedure similar to the
one in Figures 1 and 2. But now the shadow of the security agent of B is the
local proxy rather than the shadow of B. Messages are filtered at the source by
the shadow object and at the destination by the security agent.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the generation of the access control tickets and the
communication path for both trusted and enforced access control. The scheme
which enforces the access control adds additional overhead and is less
performance but more secure.
Authentication in Bond, the authentication and software distribution server.
The A&SD server provides persistent storage for security critical objects: the
Bond User object, the Bond Key object, and the Bond Software Distribution
object. BU is a vector consisting of Bond User Name and Bond Password pairs,
<BUN,BP>. A BK object consists of triples, Bond ld, public and private keys,
<BID, Kpub, Kprv> for all secure Bond objects. The BSD object consists of
tupes, lP address, public and private seed keys and the Bond Version Number,
<IP, Kpub, Kprv, BVN>.
The Authentication and Software Distribution server is responsible for:
(a) Downloading on request of the latest version of the Bond system software.
(b) Creation and maintenance of Bond accounts.
{c} Creation and maintenance of Bond security keys.
(d) Authentication.
Each of these functions is discussed separately now. Figure 4 illustrates the
process of downloading the current version of the Bond system code. The code
includes an initiator for Bond Workspace objects and a Bond user has the option
to initiate a secure workspace on the target host. The seed security keys are










<IP, Kpub, Kprv, BVN>
A&SD "Server
Figure 4. Downloading the Bond system code. The A&SD server provides HTTP and
FTP access. The code is stamped with the IP address of the requester, the
public seed key and the Bond Version Number. The Bond Software Distribution
object is updated with a new entry including the IP address, the private and
public seed keys and the Bond Version Number of the downloaded code.
The procedure to create Bond accounts is shown in Figure 5. First, a user
establishes an HTTP cormection with the A&SD server and fills out a form
requesting a Bond account. Once a Bond account is established the Bond Users
object is updated with a new entry containing the Bond User Name and the Bond










Figure 5. Establishing a new Bond account. The A&SD server provides a form and
if the request is approved a Bond User Name and a Bond Password are generated
and a new entry is added to the Bond Users object.
To start a Bond session a user follows the procedure illustrated in Figure 6.
First a workspace is started, then a sign on request is sent to the A&SD
server. The server uses the Bond User Name to find the Bond Password, decrypts
the seed public key and validates the request. It also decrypts the Bond
Version nWllber and informs the user about the need to download the current
version if the code is outdated.
Sign on requesl:
<BUN,IP, SECURITY,










\ BK<BID, SKpub, SKprv>
Figure 6. Starting a Bond session. The user starts a workspace that creates its
unique Bond Id and inherits the Bond Version Number, the Public Key and the IP
address from the downloaded Bond system software. Then the user provides the
Bond User Name, the Bond Password and specifies if a secure workspace is
desired. The workspace sends as plain text the Bond User Name, the IP address
of the host, and the security switch as well as the Bond Version NWllber, the
Bond ld of the workspace and the public key of the downloaded code encrypted
with the Bond Password. If a secure workspace is desired then public and
private session keys are generated and stored in the Bond Keys object indexed
by the Bond ld. After a successful login a secure workspace gets the session
keys encrypted with the Bond Password.
Another function of the A&SD server is
basic idea for object authentication is
to support object authentication.
illustrated in Figure 7. Assume
The
that
both A and B are secure Bond objects. To authenticate object B, A generates a
random message and asks B to encrypt it using its own private key (l) and send
the encrypted message back, together with its own Bond Id (2). Then A sends the
encrypted message to the authentication server (3) and it compares the message
















Figure 7. Object authentication in Bond.
Implementation issues
Each Bond object can choose its own security policy, it can vary from no
security check to very rigorous security check. But interface of security check
method if it is presented must be uniform. We can define Java abstract classes
which for all the security e.g. security check and service ticket generation.
Each object can make its decision to implement this security abstract class or
not. If implemented, it can also override some methods by its own
implementation. Bond also provides default security class implementations which
user can choose if they do not want to implement their own. This design leaves
the decision right of security to each object instead of using a uniform
security policy in whole system.
We defined some abstract security classes in
of what we had discussed in above sections.
abstract security classes.
Bond to fulfill the requirements
Following are several important
(l) Abstract class for key pair generation
This abstract class is for the purpose of key pair generation. Different
implementations can choose different key strength by changing the length of key
or even choose key pair generation algorithms.








(2) Abstract Class for Encryption/Decryption
Abstract Security class Cipher is a class which finishes the function of
Encryption and Decryption. User objects can subclass Cipher to have their own
implementation of Encryption and Decryption.
Abstract Class Cipher
(
public static final int ENCRYPTION 0;
public static final int DECRYPTION 1;
public void initCipher(ENCRYPT_MODE, byte[] Key);
public void addData(Sting);
public void addData(byte[ ] );
public String doFinal{String);
public String doFinal(byte[ ] );
public String doFinal();
)
(3) Abstract Class for Authentication
This abstract security class is for the purpose of authentication. It provides
the method for digital signature and method to verify signature. User objects





public void initVerify(Cipher, String plaintext);
public void addData(String )i
public void addData(Byte[ ]);
public String sign( )i
public boolean verify( );
}
(4) Abstract Class for Access Control and Security Agent
Bond also defined several abstract security classes for the purpose of access
control of Bond objects. Abstract security class AccessTicket defines the
methods to check a Bond KQML message against the access rights. User objects











Bond provides default implementations for all the defined abstract security
class above. For example, Bond implements two ciphers sub-classes from the
abstract security class Cipher: bondsymmetricEncryptioncipher and
bondAsymmtricEncryptionCipher.
bondSymmetricEncryptionCipher is a Bond class for symmetric encryption and
decryption using a single key. This single key can be a password, or a session
key in DES. bondAsymme.tricEncryptionCipher is a Bond class for asymmetric
public key encryption and decryption using public/private key pairs. Such a key
pair can be generated by the security class bondKeyPairGenerator.
Bond also provides implementations of abstract class AccessTicket and
SecurityAgent called bondAccessTicket and bondSecurityAgent by using the
definition of access right we proposed in this paper.
Conclusions
security is an important concern in any network computing environment, as
information in transit is more vulnerable, and use of resources in different
administrative domain introduces issues of trust and consistency between
them[B], [9]. Object-oriented network computing environments like Bond are
generally more complex than traditional client-server systems, and the security
issues are more subtle.
In this paper we discussed Bond's view of security in an object-oriented
network computing environment and presented the security model used by Bond for
access control. In this model, each Bond object can choose its own security
policy, it can vary from no security check to very rigorous security check.
Secure Bond objects are allowed to create their own security agents to enforce
access control. These functions are supported by a set of uniquely defined
abstract security classes. We believe this model is conceptually elegant and
flexible.
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